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Abstract 
The United States economy has suffered over the past four years from crises in mortgage 
foreclosures and in financial markets, as well as a long recession that some have referred 
to as the Great Recession. The links between these events, or more broadly the causes, 
extent and effects of these developments, are sources of continuing controversy and 
uncertainty. This paper attempts to disentangle the links between the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis, the financial crisis, a possible banking crisis and the Great Recession, 
at least in terms of timing, and also to provide an alternative view to the conventional 
wisdom, especially for the link of crises to the recession.  
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The United States economy has suffered over the past four years from crises in mortgage 
foreclosures and in financial markets, as well as a long recession that some have referred 
to as the Great Recession. The links between these events, or more broadly the causes, 
extent and effects of these developments, are sources of continuing controversy and 
uncertainty. The foreclosure crisis began in late 2006 when housing starts and housing 
prices peaked and began a steep decline. The broader financial crisis has been variously 
dated from the beginning of the foreclosure crisis, to spring 2007, when several hedge 
funds and single issue mortgage and bond insurers either failed or had their own credit 
quality seriously downgraded; to summer 2008, when Bear Stearns failed and Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were put into government conservatorship; or to September 2008, 
when Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch failed, Wachovia was forced into a takeover 
ultimately by Wells Fargo, and American International Group (AIG) almost failed before 
a federal and Federal Reserve bailout injected some $180 billion into the firm through a 
variety of loans and equity infusions. Regardless of when it began, it appears to have 
been a follow-on to the mortgage foreclosure crisis because the failures were largely 
associated with the direct holdings of mortgages or mortgage backed securities.  
 
The financial crisis presumably ended in late 2008 with some return to normalcy, or at 
least an end to mortgage related failures of investment banks. Some would argue, 
however, that the financial crisis has not ended because the market for securitized lending 
has not recovered. The recession began in the fourth quarter of 2007, a year or more after 
the onset of the mortgage foreclosure crisis and before the financial crisis began. The 
recession ended in mid-2009, after the financial crisis, but well before the end of the 
mortgage foreclosure crisis.   
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The Changing Face of the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis  
Initially, the surge in foreclosures was driven by foreclosures on adjustable rate, subprime 
loans. Many of these borrowers came late to the mortgage interest rate cycle as the 
mortgage rate outlook was deteriorating and informed borrowers knew that adjustable 
rates loans were set to re-price upward, making marginal loans unaffordable. Some of 
these borrowers were more speculative and took out such loans anyway, planning to sell 
their houses and repay the loans before they were re-priced. When the recession began, 
the situation changed, as individuals with relatively high credit ratings began to lose their 
jobs and income, and, as a result, enter the foreclosure process.   
  
Chart 
Subprime mortgage foreclosures are falling, but total foreclosures remain high 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
The chart shows the explosion in mortgage foreclosures for various types of mortgages 
from 1998 to the third quarter of 2010, except for adjustable rate subprime loans and 
prime loans series which are shown here beginning in the third quarter of 1996. The 
foreclosure inventory includes all mortgages at any stage of the foreclosure process. The 
mortgage crisis does not appear to have caused the recession because the recession did 
not begin until more than a year after the beginning of the mortgage crisis and it ended 
eighteen months ago, despite the continuing foreclosure crisis.  
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Were the Mortgage and Financial Crises Part of a Banking Crisis that Caused the 
Recession? 
While the mortgage crisis did not cause the recession, it certainly did create, or morph 
into, the financial crisis. The financial crisis also did not cause the recession, but it and 
the mortgage foreclosure crisis could have made the recession worse. The mortgage crisis 
arose because of the growth of subprime mortgage and securitization products developed 
by mortgage bankers and investment banks, largely outside the regulatory structure that 
governs bank holding companies and commercial banks or commercial banking laws. 
Significant pressure from Congress, supported by mandates and federal subsidies to 
foster homeownership, accelerated the development and growth of subprime products.   
As a result of the growth in home ownership and especially the growth of subprime 
mortgage assets, incentives were created for investment banks to develop financial 
products to leverage and manage their mortgage portfolios. These products were often 
created by nontraditional companies and thus marketed outside of traditional regulatory 
structures. These new products included subprime-based mortgage backed securities, 
collateralized debt obligations, collateralized loan obligations, auction rate securities and 
credit default swaps. While some of these products were sound, many were complex and 
confusing, creating a misunderstood risk profile. During the crises, the large failures of 
institutions occurred among non-bank financial conglomerates such as Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and American International Group (AIG).  In short, the 
mortgage and financial crises were the result of poor regulation of new financial products 
created largely outside the traditional bank regulatory structure.  
One of the ironic policy responses of the financial crisis was the notion that it was a 
banking crisis. The Treasury secretary and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve teamed 
up to convince Congress of precisely this point and to pass the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), a $700 billion program, originally intended to purchase troubled assets 
from supposedly failing financial institutions. TARP began by forcing banks and a few 
non-bank financial institutions to accept government funds without public evidence that 
they were confronting any meaningful liquidity or solvency problems. Most of the banks 
paid back these funds as soon as they were allowed.  In the end, the program was used to 
inject about $386 billion into capital of firms, but only $245 billion of that went into 
banks, $169 billion was paid back by the end of the program in October 2010 and only 
about $20 billion is expected to be lost due to failure of commercial banks.  The rest of 
the disbursements and losses of up to $30 billion will come from loans and capital 
injections to automobile companies and AIG. The notion of a banking crisis requiring 
massive bailouts of bad assets of the largest commercial banks was never justified.   
Another perspective on whether there was a bank-induced financial crisis is that the 
failure experience of depository institutions (banks and thrifts) has not risen to the level 
of the last real crisis, the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
In a new broad historical review of financial crises, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff  (2009) refer to the S&L crisis as a “bank-centered financial crisis” and they 
include it in their comparison of the subprime crisis to such crises. It must be noted that 
they use the term “milder,” and not their terms “severe” or “systemic,” in referring to the 
4 
 
S&L crisis, and they conclude that the subprime crisis was worse than other banking 
crises in advanced countries or than the five crises that they call the “Big Five” severe 
and systemic crises. Certainly this suggests that the subprime crisis was the worst since at 
least Great Depression, but one natural indicator that Reinhart and Rogoff do not review, 
the number of bank failures, suggests otherwise.   
In 2008-09 there were 165 failures (there were only three in 2007, the first year of the 
crisis), and it is likely that there will be about 160 failures in 2010.  But a total of 330 or 
so failures for 2008-2010 pale in comparison with the over four times larger number 
during the worst three years of the S&L crisis (1412 in 1989-91) or with the full 13-year 
period of elevated bank failures from 1981-93, when there were 2,335 failures, seven 
times as many as are likely in and following the recent subprime/financial crisis. Two of 
the largest thrift failures on record occurred during the recession, but bank failures have 
generally been much smaller than in the last banking crisis. At least for this indicator of 
banking crisis, the recent mortgage and financial crisis is hugely dwarfed by the so-called 
mild S&L bank-centered financial crisis. 
Whether there was a banking crisis is important because Reinhart and Rogoff find that 
banking crises lead to very long periods of recession and recovery, much longer than the 
six quarters of the recent recession and six quarters of recovery. Their study of crises 
suggests that the real economic effects of a recent crisis would last far longer, supporting 
the notion of a “double dip” recession with the economy slumping back into recession 
and subsequently experiencing very slow growth for several years.  Carmen Reinhart and 
Vincent Reinhart (2010) recently argued that even severe economic dislocations over the 
past 75 years show the same very slow recovery and subsequent slow growth as banking 
crises.  The evidence of the past six quarters, though limited, does not support such a dire 
view of the prospects for the economy.   
There are other reasons, beyond the mortgage foreclosure crisis that could have caused 
the Great Recession. For example, there were large surges in energy prices in late 2007 
and in the summer of 2008 that were larger than the energy price increases before the two 
earlier great recessions in 1973-75 and 1981-82; these recessions lasted only two months 
less than the recent recession. In the latest recession, the unemployment rate reached 10.2 
percent, which was lower than the peak 10.8 percent reached at the end of 1982. One of 
the most important recession indicators is the sharp slowing in monetary growth leading 
up to the recession.  By the end of 2007 when the recession began, the monetary base, a 
measure of Federal Reserve actions to influence monetary aggregates, spending and 
economic activity, had slowed to 1.4 percent over the previous year, insufficient to 
support the existing inflation rate, not to mention normal economic growth. Subsequent 
monetary stimulus pushed this growth, after removing the sterile surge in excess bank 
reserves, to 12.1 percent over the next year. Unfortunately, the latter measure slowed to a 
3.6 percent rate in August 2010.    
The mortgage foreclosure crisis and its related financial crisis, may have contributed to 
the recession in its worst phase at the end of 2008 and early 2009, but dramatic expected 
shifts in economic policy could equally have explained the extreme recession 
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developments from October 2008 to June 2009. Many analysts believe that the financial 
crisis was a banking crisis and as such is likely to have led to an extended recession, now 
including a “double dip,” and relatively slow growth for several years. The continuing 
recovery and bank failure evidence do not support that view, however.    
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